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I said to the wanting-creature inside me: 
What is this river you want to cross? 
There are no travelers on the river-road, and no road. 
Do you see anyone moving about on that bank, or resting? 
There is no river at all, and no boat, and no boatman. 
There is no tow rope either, and no one to pull it. 
There is no ground, no sky, no time, no bank, no ford! 
 
And there is no body, and no mind! 
Do you believe there is some place that will make the soul less thirsty? 
In that great absence you will find nothing. 
 
Be strong then, and enter into your own body; 
there you have a solid place for your feet. 
Think about it carefully! 
Don't go off somewhere else! 
 
Kabir says this: just throw away all thoughts of 
imaginary things, and stand firm in that which you are. 
 
Kabir ( Translated by Robert Bly) 
 
  
 
 
Abstract 
Mindfulness and mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) have been applied in 
numerous fields from behavioral medicine, nursing and psychiatry, to psychology 
and social work.  Research on mindfulness and MBIs is increasingly providing 
evidence of the efficacy and benefits of MBIs for the treatment of a vast array of 
conditions. Yet,  the application of mindfulness in the field of social work is still at 
its initial stages and among the most recent areas of its application includes the 
treatment of substance use disorders. However, the current research on mindfulness 
is based on epistemological and methodological stances that allow only a partial 
investigation of the phenomenon, as it is primary focused on the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of mindfulness and MBIs or in the search of its underlying neurological 
mechanism. The aim of this work is to employ the experience of five Swedish 
practitioners to understand the influence of mindfulness in the social work 
therapeutic relationship, and exploring the advantages and challenges that MBIs offer 
in the treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context. The aim is 
pursued relying on a descriptive phenomenological research design. The main 
findings of this work suggest: (a) the suitability of phenomenology in theorizing 
mindfulness and MBIs within the therapeutic encounter and in the treatment of 
substance use disorders;  (b) the body is the main tool in the process of understanding 
one’s own emotional and cognitive life in the therapeutic work with mindfulness and 
MBIs; (c) the compassionate, accepting and non-judging features of mindfulness and 
MBIs offer a valuable ideological alternative to the zero tolerance model and the 
treatment methods that characterize the Swedish drug policy; (d) mindfulness is not 
merely a therapeutic tool but represents an overreaching aspect of the life of its 
practitioners, whether they are social workers or clients. 
 
Keywords: mindfulness, MBIs, phenomenology, substance use disorders treatment, 
social work. 
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1. Introduction 
Imagine you are sipping a cup of tea, or walking to meet with an old friend. Where is 
your mind, your thoughts, in that exact moment, when you are sipping that tea, or 
walking to meet your friend? How often do you find your mind wandering in 
different realms, such as your working life, your relationships or your economic 
situation? How often is your mind distracted by past experiences, memories and by 
the future and its uncertainty and promises? And again, how often do you find the tea 
cup empty, or  do you finally arrive at the place where you are supposed to meet your 
friend, and feel like you never drunk that tea or walked the long alley that brought 
you to the meeting place? 
 How many times are you speaking with somebody and thinking about 
something else (the laundry that needs to be done, your parents aging, your dreams 
about the future)? How many times are our minds, one, two, or ten steps away from 
our bodies? The cultivation and the practice of mindfulness is about reducing this 
distance and finally connecting our minds and bodies. This process can have 
powerful transformative impacts in the way we live our lives. Mindfulness is about 
being here and now, moment after moment, fully embracing whatever happens to 
unfold in the present and thus competently relate to it, because the present is the only 
time we can inhabit.  
 Mindfulness, described as moment to moment, non-judgmental awareness of 
one’s experience as it unfolds (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) has received its most elaborated 
systematization in Buddhism, in which it is described by some traditions as the heart 
of Buddhist meditation (e.g., Gethin, 2011, p. 266; Kabat-Zinn, 2005, p. 25; 
Nyanaponika, 1962, p. 14). Today, mindfulness is not merely seen as part of one’s 
spiritual journey, but is increasingly adopted as an integral component of many 
therapeutic interventions, together with traditional clinical methods in person-
oriented services.  
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1.1.  Why mindfulness in the Swedish context?  
Although still at its primary stages, the inclusion of mindfulness and MBIs in 
Swedish clinical settings is currently developing (e.g., Hilte, 2014; Franke, 2014; 
Sundquist et al., 2015). Thus, the institutionalization of mindfulness in Swedish 
clinical settings could be considered as a particular aspect of the globalizing 
processes of transnationalization, popularization, commodification and finally 
scientification of mindfulness, that both enhances and is enhanced by the 
convergence between Western and Eastern approaches to knowledge.  
 In other words, on the one hand, the meeting between first-person 
perspectives
1
 as found in contemplative traditions, and Buddhism in particular, and 
third-person perspectives as found in the Western take on reality and knowledge 
production signifies a re-orientation of mindfulness from its original contexts and 
related ontological and epistemological stances toward rationalist knowledge, 
constructed as instrumental, techno-scientific and secular (Scholte, 2005, p. 258-9).  
 On the one other hand, the inclusion of mindfulness within mainstream 
Western settings is fostered by what could be defined as a paradigm shift transversely 
investing western scientific communities, and our modern societies overall. In fact we 
are assisting to ontological (ways of being) and epistemological (ways of knowing) 
shifts characterizing the confluence of modern Western science with ancient Eastern 
traditions. These movements of convergence, both at an epistemological level and at 
a methodological one, have been clearly emphasized by Varela, Thompson and 
Roach, (1991) and Thompson (2007) in their attempts to merge a third-person 
scientific perspective with first-person accounts as found in Buddhism and 
phenomenological philosophy. 
                                                          
1
 Within the framework of this thesis first person-perspectives are understood as experienced-based 
processes of knowledge acquisition, as found in contemplative traditions, or in Husserl’s and 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological inquiries. Third person-perspective are understood as the 
traditional Western approach to knowledge production based on the scientific landmarks of 
objectivity, measurement and cause-effect, where the researcher is considered as radically other 
from her object of study.  
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 The work of Varela and colleagues (1991) and Thompson (2007) are not 
however isolated voices. In fact the development of highly accountable scientific 
platforms such as Science and Nonduality (SAND)
2
 and Mind and Life Institute
3
, 
where leading researchers, philosophers, teachers and artists among others, contribute 
to the convergence of science and spirituality, underlines the growing concerns about 
Western rationalism and its explanatory power.  
 As underlined by Williams and  Kabat-Zinn, “Ancient and modern, Eastern 
and Westerner modes of inquiry and investigations are now in conversations and 
cross-fertilizing each other as never before” (2011, p. 15). It is within this framework 
that, through the contemplative education movement in higher education
4
 (Bush, 
2011, p. 185), mindfulness and its underlying contemplative epistemology is gaining 
access in disciplines as diverse as neuroscience, architecture, psychology and social 
work. 
 In other words, narrowing the aim of the discussion to the therapeutic field, 
we are witnessing the confluence between traditional Western treatment methods and 
ancient Eastern traditions in our approaches to therapeutic practices. In fact, in the 
last decades MBIs have been applied in numerous fields from behavioral medicine, 
nursing and psychiatry, to psychology and social work.  Research on MBIs, such as 
MBSR
5
 (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), MBCT
6
 (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) and 
                                                          
2
For an exhaustive overview of SAND, its missions and current projects see 
http://www.scienceandnonduality.com/.  
3
 For an exhaustive overview of Mind and Life Institute, its missions and current projects see 
http://www.mindandlife.org/. 
4
 For an overview of the development of the contemplative education movement in higher education 
in different fields see Bush (2011). Full reference in bibliography.  
5
 Kabat-Zinn and colleagues started their innovative program, namely MBSR at the Stress Reduction 
Clinic (founded in 1979) and then at the Center for Mindfulness and Medicine, Health Care and 
Society (founded in 1995) at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, to help people with 
chronic physical pain and other medical conditions (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). 
6
 Inspired by the effectiveness and success of the MBSR, Segal, Williams and Teasdale (2002), well-
known scientists in their field, developed MBCT for the treatment of depression merging MBSR and 
traditional Cognitive Therapy, thus further fostering the growing attention gained by mindfulness and 
MBIs. 
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MBRP
7
(Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010)
8
 is increasingly providing growing 
evidence of the efficacy and benefits of MBIs (e.g., Chiesa & Seretti, 2014; 
Grossman, et al., 2004; Kuyken, et al., 2008). The therapeutic employment of 
mindfulness and MBIs aims to break the chain of the automatic reactions to stressful 
situations and give its practitioners the means to competently relate with them. This is 
primarily achieved starting from gaining increased awareness of their minds and 
bodies in the present, and subsequently, once they have learnt how to recognize their 
automatic reactive tendencies, substituting them with skillful responses (e.g., Bowen, 
Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal, William & Teasdale, 2002). 
 However, despite these promising results there are growing concerns, 
especially from Buddhist scholars, regarding the plausible inclusion of mindfulness in 
clinical practice. These concerns arise from the fear that mindfulness as 
conceptualized in its modern application struggles to account for the complexities and 
nuances of its conceptualization in the original sources (e.g., Bodhi, 2011; Dreyfus, 
2011; Gethin, 2011). Further criticisms, as we will see later on in this work, regards 
the current epistemological and methodological stances embraced by the mainstream 
research on mindfulness and its clinical application, which are considered inadequate 
for the study of mindfulness (Gethin, 2011; Grossman &Van Dam, 2011). 
 The Swedish landscape is just one among the fields in which these 
movements of convergence are played out, yet it is a particularly interesting one 
                                                          
7
 Marlatt and colleagues developed Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention (MBRP) (Bowen, Chawla, 
& Marlatt, 2010), an outpatient program that integrates skills from cognitive behavioral relapse 
prevention (RP
7
) (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) and MBIs such as MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990)  and MBCT 
(Segal, William &Teasdale, 2002). 
8 Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy for depression (MBCT) (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) and Mindfulness-Based Relapse 
Prevention (MBRP) (Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010) manuals are the main protocolled 
interventions in which mindfulness is included within traditional Western treatment methods. They 
are commonly known as Mindfulness-Based Interventions (MBIs). Other MBIs which have not 
explicitly discussed in this thesis because their different focus are: Mindfulness-based Eating 
Awareness Training (Kristeller, Baer & Quallian-Wolever, 2006), Mindfulness-based Elder Care 
(McBee, 2008), and finally Mindfulness-based Childbirth and Parenting (Duncan & Bardacke, 2010).   
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especially in reference to the treatment of substance use disorders with mindfulness 
and MBIs. MBIs and MBRP in particular, rooted in the tradition of mindfulness and 
mindfulness meditation as structured in Buddhist philosophy, may provide an 
alternative to the main treatment methods employed in the Swedish context, which 
are historically constructed within the framework of zero tolerance ideology (e.g., 
Edman, 2013; Edman & Stenius, 2014; Ekendhal, 2012). As a consequence Swedish 
drug policy is prohibitive in character and fosters the implementation of coercive 
treatments, within a paternalistic approach (e.g., Hallam, 2010; Edman & Stenius, 
2014; Moore, Fraser, Törrönen & Eriksson Tinghög, 2015). Within this framework, 
MBIs and MBRP in particular could be considered as harm-reduction measures 
offering an ideological alternative to the overall Swedish drug policy and mainstream 
treatment methods.  
 
2. Aim 
The aim of this work is to employ the experience of Swedish practitioners to 
understand the influence of mindfulness in the social work therapeutic relationship, 
and to explore the advantages and challenges that MBIs offer in the treatment of 
substance use disorders. The central concern of this thesis is to explore when and 
how mindfulness unfolds in the therapeutic relationship in the field of substance use 
disorders. Yet, this study is not a critical evaluation of mindfulness as a clinical 
method, but an analysis on the practitioners’ experience of its relevance and 
effectiveness.  
 This thesis places itself in conversation with the broader debates on Swedish 
drug policy and consequent treatment methods and on ontological and 
epistemological stances, namely between third-person and first-person perspectives. 
This is of extreme relevance since, accounting for the overall approach of this thesis, 
there is a need to explore the phenomenon chosen not as isolated from the specific 
socio-political and cultural traits in which it arises.   
 The research question guiding this work is: 
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In what way can mindfulness and MBIs influence the therapeutic relationship 
and the treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context?  
 In the attempt to answer this question three sub-questions have been 
employed: 
1. How is the therapeutic relationship understood and characterized in a 
mindfulness based intervention? 
2. How can mindfulness contribute to the creation, development and cultivation 
of the therapeutic relationship? 
3. What are the main contributions that mindfulness and MBIs offer in the 
treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context? 
 
 The first two sub-questions are designed to explore the influence of 
mindfulness in the therapeutic relationship. As we will see later on in the thesis, most 
of the literature emphasizes the positive influence of mindfulness in the therapeutic 
relationship (Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008; Gockel, et al., 2013), but does not 
exhaustively discuss how mindfulness leads to its numerous positive effects 
(Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008). It has been found that mindfulness contributes to the 
therapeutic relationship in social work, yet we do not know how this influence 
practically takes place. In fact there is scarce understanding of the actual relation 
between what mindfulness signifies in theory and how it actually unfolds in practice.  
 This may be due to both the lack of contextualization that most studies display 
and to their epistemological and methodological shortcomings. In fact, the 
mainstream approach to the study of mindfulness and its clinical application is 
primarily concerned, in line with the dominant scientific paradigm based on 
rationalism, with theorizing or evaluating mindfulness in its clinical applications 
within the perspective and with the tools of our traditional Western third-person 
perspective (Gethin, 2011; Grossman &Van Dam, 2011). Thus, a context-sensitive 
phenomenological inquiry may offer an alternative approach and contributes to fill 
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this research gap. In fact, the employment of a phenomenological approach allows to 
study mindfulness and its clinical application accounting for first-person, experience-
based perspectives, thus investigating the phenomenon from its own vantage point 
(Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007).   
 Furthermore, it allows to account for the practical unfolding of mindfulness 
within the therapeutic relationship and the advantages of the application of MBIs in 
the field of substance use disorders treatment, with a focus on experiences as 
experienced  (e.g., Davidson, 2003; Englander, 2010; Giorgi, 2009), or in other words 
on first-person perspectives, without neglecting the socio-political and cultural 
dimensions in which the phenomenon studied takes place.  
 In order to understand the influences of mindfulness and MBIs in the 
therapeutic relationship, we need a knowledge on the contextual dimensions in which 
this very therapeutic relationship occurs. For this purpose, the third sub-question has 
been developed. 
 Concerning the third sub-question, it is important to underline that the 
application of MBIs in the field of substance use disorders is the latest area of 
implementations of MBIs into Western health-care settings, and thus it is still under 
researched (Bayles, 2014). However, my study of the contributions that MBIs may 
offer to the treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context does not not 
aim to be a comparison or an evaluation between MBIs and treatment as usual. This 
study aims, among the rest, to underline the importance of including first-person 
perspectives, as found in both phenomenological inquiries and Buddhism, within the 
framework of sound scientific inquiries. Furthermore the third sub-question offers the 
chance to explore on an empirical basis the relation between Buddhist philosophy and 
person-oriented health-care facilities in the treatment of substance use disorders. 
 Reframing the aim of this thesis including the three sub-questions presented, 
this work aims to contribute to the discussion on three great tensions characterizing 
western science overall, the current state of research on mindfulness, and more 
specifically mindfulness in social work. The first tension, namely the gap between 
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theory and practice as found in the literature, is mainly tackled through the first two 
sub-questions. The second tension, concerned with the mainstream judging and 
stigmatizing approaches to substance use and substance disorders treatment in 
relation to accepting and non-judgmental approaches informed by mindfulness, is 
underlined by the third sub-question. Finally, the third tension, between first-person 
and third-person accounts is addressed by all the three sub-question.   
 Concluding, in table 1 the reader can find a schematized version of the aims 
of this thesis.  
 Table 1. 
Level of 
analysis  
Object of analysis  Tensions Sub-research 
questions 
Micro  Therapeutic 
relationship 
Theory vs  
practice  
1 and 2 
Meso Drug policies and 
treatment methods 
Judgmental and 
stigmatizing 
approaches vs 
accepting and non-
judgmental ones  
3 
Macro Ontological and 
epistemological 
stances 
Third-person vs 
first-person 
perspectives 
1,2 and 3 
  
3. Mindfulness in social work: a research overview 
The current leading research on mindfulness is based on the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of mindfulness and MBIs or in the search of its underlying neurological 
mechanism (e.g., Hölzel et al., 2011; Shapiro, et al., 2006; Witkiewitz, Lustyk & 
Bowen, 2013).  This is particularly evident in fields such as medicine (e.g., Davidson 
at al., 2003; Kimbrough et al., 2010; Lee & Orsillo, 2014) and psychology (e.g., Baer, 
2003; 2011; Brewer, Elwafi & Davis, 2014; Gethin, 2011) thus underlining the 
rationalist logos attached to the study of mindfulness in these disciplines.  
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This body of work provides evidences of the efficacy of mindfulness and 
MBIs and on their plausible functioning at a neurological level, yet seems to lack 
what has been previously named in this thesis as first-person perspective’s accounts. 
 An example of this mainstream approach to the investigation of mindfulness 
is a recent study conducted in Sweden by a team of researchers from Lund University 
(Sundquist et al., 2015). This study shows that mindfulness group therapy based on 
MBSR and MBCT in primary care patients with depression, anxiety, stress and 
adjustment disorders is as effective as individual Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(CBT). However, CBT is expensive for the tax-financed healthcare system and 
requires the involvement of more therapists, since in Sweden it is manly given on an 
individual basis. Thus mindfulness group therapy displays as effective as traditional 
CBT but is more cost-efficient (Sundquist et al., 2015). 
Although mindfulness has been applied in the realm of social and cognitive 
psychology (e.g., Baer, 2011; Brewer, Elwafi & Davis, 2014; Ma & Teasdale, 2004) 
and medicine (e.g., Davidson at al., 2003; Kimbrough et al., 2010; Lee & Orsillo, 
2014), its application in the field of social work is still at its initial stages (Birnbaum 
& Birnbaum, 2008; Gockel, et al., 2013).  Furthermore, contrary to the leading 
research on mindfulness in medicine and psychology,  part of the research on 
mindfulness in social work originates within the contemplative education movement 
and its concerns for holistic, non-dual and transpersonal understandings
9
 (e.g., 
Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008; Sherman & Siporin, 2008; Wong, 2013). Hence this 
body of work displays as substantially critical toward the dominant rationalist take on 
scientific inquiry and is more qualitatively oriented compared with the general trend 
in health care sciences and psychology. 
                                                          
9
 In the context of the contemplative education movement in higher education holistic, non-dual and 
transpersonal indicate an attention toward the overcoming of the Cartesian division between mind 
and body, subject and object, self and other, thus being substantially attuned with certain strands of 
Buddhist philosophy and certain interpretations of phenomenological philosophy. 
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 Moreover, leading strands of research emphasize the role of practitioners’ 
own mindful practice, or as Germer (2005) puts it of mindful-presence in 
psychotherapy, to be of crucial importance in the therapeutic relationship. As a result, 
the social work therapeutic relationship, defined as both the physical encounter 
between clients and social workers and as the overall therapeutic process, seems to 
offer a privileged vantage point for the practice and the study of mindfulness.  
In fact, studies have been acknowledging the positive correlation of 
mindfulness with foundational aspect of successful therapeutic relationships, such as 
practitioner’s attention, acceptance, empathy, and self awareness (e.g., Brenner, 2009; 
Germer, 2005; Turner, 2009). These therapeutic qualities have been recently related 
as the ‘‘common factors’’ transcending therapists’ orientation and treatment methods 
(Bennett & Nelson, 2008) for effective clinical practice and have become of 
increasing interest in clinical social work.  
 Considering the benefits of mindfulness in the development of practitioner’s 
skills and consequently for the social work therapeutic relationship and the 
effectiveness of MBIs, there is growing interest for the potential role of mindfulness 
within social work practice and education (Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008). More 
specifically, the benefits that mindfulness trainings and MBIs may have for social 
work students (e.g., Birnbaum, 2005; 2008;  Gockel, et al., 2012; Gockel, et al., 2013; 
Wong, 2004; 2013),  practitioners (e.g. Brenner, 2009; Germer, 2005; McGarrigle & 
Walsh, 2011) and clients (e.g., Broderick & Metz, 2009; Coholic, 2005; Kane, 2006) 
have recently started to  be investigated.  
With specific reference to the Swedish context, it is worth mentioning a recent 
book of Mats Hilte, senior lecturer at the School of Social Work of Lund University. 
The book Mindfulness i socialt arbete: en introduction (2014), is the first Swedish 
introduction on mindfulness thought for both students and practitioners. The book 
provides an overview on the role of mindfulness in relation to  social work and 
related helping professions, stressing the intrinsic values that its inclusion may add to 
these professional practices (Hilte, 2014).  
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Hilte (2014, p. 9), summarizing the current state of research, further 
underlines how, among the different purposes and work areas in which mindfulness 
fruitfully relates with social work figure: 
 The fostering of the therapeutic relationship between social workers and 
clients. 
 The development of practitioners’ self-care.  
 The development of practitioners’ ability to reflect towards one’s own actions.  
 The use of mindfulness as an intervention for social work clients, in particular 
in the field of addiction.  
 
3.1. Mindfulness and substance use disorders treatment 
Among the most recent areas of application of MBIs is the treatment of substance 
use disorders
10
 (e.g., Bowen et al., 2009; Bowen & Enkema, 2014; Witkiewitz et al., 
2013a). However ,the research on MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders is 
still relatively unexplored (Bayles, 2014).  Accounting for the finding of this body of 
work it is possible to conclude that MBIs are successful in treating a vast variety of 
substance use disorders, ranging from alcohol dependence (Zgierska et al., 2008; 
Garland, at al., 2010), alcohol and cocaine use disorders (Brewer et al, 2009) and 
nicotine dependence (Bowen & Marlatt, 2009; Davis, at al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
results of these studies are consistent with the current neurobiological research 
emphasizing the relation between mindful practices and changes in brain regions 
involved in modulation of arousal and emotional regulation (e.g., Hölzel et al., 2008; 
Hölzel et al., 2011; Lazar et al., 2000; Witkiewitz, Lustyk, & Bowen, 2013). For a 
review of the growing number of studies on the assessment of the efficacy of MBIs 
                                                          
10
 Substance use disorders at the purpose of this project are understood as only referring to illegal 
substances thus excluding the consumption of legal substances such as alcohol or prescribed drugs, 
eating disorders and other addictive behaviors such as sex, gambling etc., etc. 
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in the treatment of substance use disorders the reader is referred to Chiesa & 
Serretti’s (2014) recent work. 
 The application of MBIs to the field of substance use disorders is closely 
associated with the work of Alan Marlatt and colleagues from the University of 
Washington’s Addictive Behaviors Research Center (e.g., Bowen et al., 2009; 
Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010; Witkiewitz et al., 2013a). Marlatt and colleagues 
developed Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention (MBRP) (Bowen, Chawla, & 
Marlatt, 2010), an outpatient program that integrates skills from cognitive behavioral 
relapse prevention (RP
11
) (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) and MBIs such as MBSR 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990)  and MBCT (Segal, William &Teasdale, 2002).  
 MBRP is a protocoled 8-weeks aftercare treatment merging cognitive-
behavioral treatment with mindfulness and, in line with other MBIs is designed to 
foster competent responses to stressful situations and decrease automatic and reactive 
behaviors (Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010).  This is achieved through the training 
of the participants in recognizing both internal (e.g., emotional or cognitive) and 
external (e.g., situational) cues previously associated with substance use (Bowen et 
al., 2009, p. 296). Participants are encouraged to develop self-awareness, acceptance 
and tolerance of cognitive, emotional and physical states, thus decreasing the need to 
alleviate discomfort through substance taking behaviors (Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 
2010).  
 MBRP offers an alternative stance to the theoretical foundations of 
mainstream approaches to the treatment of substance use disorders, such as the 12-
steps approach (Bayles, 2014; Bowen et al., 2009). The latter, rooted in the disease 
model of addiction, assumes addiction is derived in the biochemical imbalances 
                                                          
11 RP is a cognitive-behavioral treatment combining skills-training with cognitive interventions to 
prevent or limit relapse with a focus to high-risks situations. RP has been previously applied for 
treatment of several types of substance abuse such as amphetamine (Baker, Boggs & Lewin, 2001), 
cocaine (Schmitz, Stotts, Rhoades & Grabowski, 2001) and marijuana (Stephens,  Roffman, & 
Simpson, 1994). 
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occurring in the body of the consumers and thus outside of their control (e.g., 
Goldberg, 1999; 2001; Uusitalo, Salmela & Nikkinen, 2013).  
 On the contrary, MBRP theoretical foundations, rooted in mindfulness and 
Buddhist philosophy (Marlatt, 2002), contribute to shape a highly accepting, non 
judgmental and compassionate approach to the treatment of substance use disorders. 
Hence, MBRP displays as an harm-reduction measure, which considers relapses as 
part of the recovery process,  contributing to dismiss moralism, shame, idealism, and 
judgment toward substance consumers, in opposition to the war on drugs, its zero 
tolerance ideology (e.g., Bayles, 2014; Global  Commission  on  Drug  Policy,  2011; 
2014; Marlatt, 2002) and consequent treatment methods (Bowen et al., 2009). 
  
3.3. Concluding remarks: filling the research gap 
Although mindfulness and MBIs are increasingly evaluated and thus providing 
growing evidence of their effectiveness, the integration of mindfulness into the field 
of social work is still at its initial stages (Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008; Gockel, Cain, 
Malove & James, 2013).  Furthermore, most of the literature emphasizes the positive 
influence of mindfulness in the therapeutic relationship but does not exhaustively 
discuss how mindfulness leads to its positive effects (Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008).   
 The literature explored presents a void between the knowledge we have on  
theoretical conceptualizations of mindfulness, its benefits and contributions to the 
therapeutic relationship and how these practically take place. Most of the studies 
revised are based on epistemological and methodological assumptions which are at 
odd with the experience-based nature of mindfulness (Gethin, 2011; Grossman &Van 
Dam, 2011) and do not take into account the socio-political and cultural contexts in 
which the therapeutic application of mindfulness occurs. Therefore it seems 
particularly important to open up the discussion including these dimensions in order 
to approach the phenomenon studied, not as if unfolding in a social vacuum.  
  Thus, research on MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders is still 
relatively unexplored (Bayles, 2014).  
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 Most of the current research on the application of MBIs for the treatment of 
substance use disorders, such as MBRP, is focusing on evaluating the feasibility and 
efficacy of these interventions, thus neglecting qualitative inquiries. However, it is 
worth to mention the work of Cecilia Franke (2014) as an exception at these regards. 
Within the framework of her master thesis at Linköping University, she conducted a 
qualitative study exploring the experiences’ of participants with substance use 
disorders after completing MBRP, and the impact it had on their substance use and 
relapses in a long term perspective. The results of this study display further evidence 
of the effectiveness of MBRP for the participants’ substance use and relapse 
prevention and for their overall well-being.  
 
4. Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided in to two main parts. Part I introduces the methodology, meta-
theoretical concerns, methods of inquiry and theoretical references. Methodologically 
and theoretically, the study is based on Husserlian descriptive phenomenology (e.g., 
1970; 1981; 1983), while the method of inquiry, based on Davidson’s (2003) 
descriptive, meaning-oriented phenomenological approach, is open-ended interviews. 
Furthermore Part I, in line with the context-sensitive phenomenological approach 
employed, contextualizes the research in its socio-political contexts. It discusses the 
mainstream understanding of substance use and substance use disorders treatment 
with particular reference to Sweden, and the plausible alternative stance provided by 
MBIs’ non-judgmental, accepting and compassionate features. 
  Part II introduces the analysis of the empirical material, composed by five 
open-ended interviews with practitioners working with mindfulness and MBIs in the 
field of substance use disorders treatment in Sweden. Part II ends with a short 
conclusion, where the main findings of the thesis are summarized. Finally it also 
sketches s few ideas for further research.  
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Part I 
1. Methodology 
In this section I aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the underlying 
assumptions and research procedures informing the thesis’ research design. More 
specifically this section discusses the overall research design, the method used and 
the theoretical framework of this thesis. According to the employment of a 
descriptive phenomenological research method, epistemological, methodological and 
theoretical discussions are intrinsically bound and thus need to be approached 
simultaneously (Davidson, 2003; Eriksson, 2015).  
 
1.1.    Meta-theoretical perspective: a descriptive phenomenological position  
In this work meta-theory is understood as the theory of science embraced by the 
researcher, or in other words as the epistemological standpoint of reference.  Despite 
the apparent focus on a philosophical level, meta-theoretical positions are highly 
practical considering their fundamental role in guiding each subsequent step of the 
research design. Considering the meta-theoretical position of this work as emerging 
within Husserlian descriptive phenomenological philosophy (e.g., Husserl, 1970; 
1981; 1983) both data collection and data analysis, will follow descriptive 
phenomenology in order to achieve scientific rigor (Davidson, 2003; Englander, 
2012, p. 15).   
 Furthermore, descriptive phenomenology is here employed as both the 
epistemological ground of the thesis and as its methodological and theoretical 
reference. As underlined by Eriksson (2015, p. 21) even if phenomenology is highly 
theoretical it is not a theory within an already established theory of science, but it is 
primarily an epistemology in itself. Hence, when phenomenology is applied as a 
research method it does not require theoretical engagements besides its unavoidable 
theoretical grounding in phenomenological philosophy (Davidson, 2003). 
 The approach used is descriptive as it privileges description over other 
philosophical alternatives such as interpretation, construction or explanation. Yet 
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Langdridge (2007; 2008) argues that interpretation is not in opposition with a 
descriptive phenomenological approach. Following Ricoeur (1981) it could be said 
that despite Husserlian phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of 
hermeneutics, interpretation is intrinsic in any process of understanding, and thus 
even in Husserlian phenomenology itself. Hence, the phenomenological approach 
followed in this project aims to remain primarily descriptive, however without 
neglecting theoretical grounding and interpretation (Davidson, 2003).  
 The analysis of the empirics gathered has been descriptive, meaning that the 
empirics stand for their self-evidence (Davidson, 2003; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; 
Giorgi, 2009).  As a result in this work interpretation does not occur as a 
philosophical and methodological choice on how to approach the empirical material, 
but rather as an unavoidable aspect of any process of understanding (Ricoeur, 1981).  
 The approach used is phenomenological in that it accounts for the experience 
of a given phenomenon, as it manifests itself to the consciousness of the experiencer. 
As Sokolowski (2000, p. 2) states “Phenomenology is the study of human experience 
and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience”. To 
quote the words of Amedeo Giorgi, the founder of phenomenological psychology,  
“It is the experience as experienced that interests phenomenology” (2009, p. 69).  
 Consequently, within the phenomenological perspective proposed, subjective 
experiences are considered to be the departing point of any investigation. However, 
contrary to some reductionist reading, phenomenology is not a solipsistic empiricist 
project (e.g., Davidson, 2003; Gallagher, 2012; Zahavi, 2001), but one that has  
highly scientific accountability as its primarily concern (Gallagher, 2012). It is not 
surprising then, given its focus on the structures and components of human 
experience, that despite the fact that phenomenology starts as a philosophical project 
with Husserl’s work (e.g., 1970; 1981; 1983) it has developed to both a plausible 
theoretical framework and as an empirically oriented qualitative methodology for 
social scientific research (Davidson, 2003). 
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 Yet, even in disciplines such as cognitive science, the contributions of 
scholars such as Varela, Thompson and Roach (1991) and Thompson (2007) rely on 
phenomenological philosophy, stressing the need to include first-person inquiries 
within the framework of Western scientific paradigms if our exploration aims to be 
sound. For instance, as underlined by Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 28) the 
dominant approach to our current scientific inquiries it has been so far to understand  
consciousness mainly as an object in the natural world, and thus subjected to its law 
of causality. Hence the natural consequence of this vantage point is to study it 
employing a third-person perspective.  
 The link between the phenomenological position embraced in this thesis and 
contemplative traditions such as Buddhism, is that contrary to the dominant Western 
rationalist approach to knowledge, both phenomenology and Buddhism consider 
experiences as bodily and thus subjectively inhabited by the experiencer to be the 
primarily step in the process of knowledge acquisition. This point is of extreme 
relevance for the discussion at hand, since it addresses the dual root of modern 
rational thought as deriving from Cartesian metaphysics (e.g., Husserl, 1970; 1981; 
1983; Kelly, 2006; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007). Thus 
within the framework of Cartesian inspired understanding the only knowledge that 
was assumed to be objective in nature was the knowledge produced by the cognizing 
subject through the thinking process, relegating the body to the role of useless 
spectator (Kenny, 2006, 36-40). Yet, as Thompson (2007, p. 14) underlines, once 
science opens up to first-person, experiential inquiries it cannot avoid employing 
phenomenological analysis therefore reclaiming the importance of this vantage point 
in the study of subjectivity and consciousness.  
 Then, how does a Husserlian descriptive phenomenological perspective 
translate into practice when doing social scientific research?  
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2. Method 
In this section the method used to collect the empirics, its underlying theoretical 
references and the process of data collection are discussed. 
 
2.1.    A descriptive, meaning-oriented phenomenological method 
As emphasized by the phenomenological psychologists Amedeo Giorgi (2009) and 
Magnus Englander (2012), there is a great deal of literature on how to conduct 
qualitative interviews; however, there is very limited material on how to conduct 
interviews from a Husserlian phenomenological, human scientific perspective.  
 In the literature there are a variety of different phenomenological research 
methods, such as descriptive phenomenological research methods (e.g., Davidson, 
2003; Giorgi, 2009), interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (e.g., Davidsen, 
2013), and phenomenological ethnographic methods (e.g., Neergaard et al., 2009). 
However, after having conducted a pilot interview in early October using Giorgi’s 
(2009) descriptive phenomenological method I decided to employ Davidson’s (2003) 
method. Despite Giorgi’s (2009) method, together with the works of sociologists 
such as Schütz (1967) and Gurwitsch (1979), has the merits to be among the first 
structured attempts to include phenomenological inquiries in the social sciences, 
Davidson’s (2003) method has been chosen for the following reasons: it is in line 
with the overall philosophical positioning of this thesis, namely Husserlian 
phenomenology; it allows the collection of thick first-person descriptions without 
requiring the time needed for conducting a phenomenological study accounting for 
Giorgi’s phenomenological research method; and it is concerned with the socio-
cultural context in which the phenomenon studied takes place, thus being in line with 
the Global Studies orientation of this thesis.  
 Other approaches that could have served well the purpose of this work are 
narrative oriented ones.  However Davidson’s (2003) method has been chose over 
others since it offers a context-sensitive, phenomenological inquiry based on the 
collection of participants’ narratives, thus representing a very suitable tool.  
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 With these premises in mind we can now proceed to the discussion of 
Davidson’s (2003) method.  
 
2.1.2. The epoché of objective science 
The first step of this method is the “epoché of objective science” meaning the 
momentary setting aside or the bracketing of our theoretical-scientific assumptions 
about the objective nature (in natural scientific terms) of the phenomenon 
investigated (Husserl, 1970, p. 135). This first step allows us to switch the focus 
from the physical realm to the psychical one, understanding the latter as the locus of 
experience. 
 Accounting for an analysis grounded in Husserlian phenomenology (Husserl, 
1983), in the natural world, objects are regulated by the law of causality, and are 
subject to ordered, predictable laws that allow measurement and objectification. 
Drawing a parallelism with the law of causality we can then claim that in the psychic 
realm its objects are subject to the law of motivation (Davidson, 2003; Husserl, 
1983). In the realm of the psychic, in the life-world or world of everyday life we find 
subjectivities to be embedded in a network of motivational relationships which allow 
us to make sense of even seemingly obscure and inaccessible experiences.  
 The realm of the psychic, or phenomenal realm, contrary to the physic realm, 
allows to look at the individuals not as relating with their surrounding environment 
merely on the basis of material nexus of causality but as intrinsically embedded in 
historical, social and cultural motivational dimensions.  
 Through the first step of the method, once  the realm of concern for the 
research has been defined and the law of causality momentarily suspended to leave 
space to the law of motivation, the second step can be introduced, the 
“phenomenological-psychological reduction” (Husserl, 1970, p. 235).   
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2.1.3. The phenomenological-psychological reduction 
The phenomenological-psychological reduction implies the bracketing or reduction 
of everything else beside the participant’s experience that we aim to access. What are 
the implications of this, momentarily setting aside everything except our participant’s 
narrative account? 
 The main implication is that when performing the phenomenological-
psychological reduction, rather than attempting to explain our participant’s 
experience, according to the law of causality and its inherent causal explanation 
model, we establish a new ground of what has to be considered as real. Thus the 
phenomenological-psychological reduction allows the researcher to set aside her 
commonsense understanding of reality embracing an understanding of the real based 
on the acts of experiencing themselves (Davidson, 2003, p.100-101). In other words 
the researcher is not interested in her own understanding of a specific phenomenon, 
for instance mindfulness, but on the process of meaning constitution of that specific 
phenomenon in the experience of the research informants.  
 Hence, we assist to a further significant shift, from what is traditionally 
considered as a scientific domain, namely the objects experienced, to the constituting 
acts of experiencing these objects in consciousness. This shift is what Husserl (1970) 
named the movement from our everyday “natural attitude”  about our relation to a 
physical world constituted of measurable objects, to the “personal attitude” of human 
sciences, where contrary to the object themselves, the act of constituting whatever 
object in consciousness becomes the primarily focus of attention.  
 In phenomenological terms, thanks to the phenomenological-psychological 
reduction we set aside the natural attitude and enter the personal attitude, thus 
attempting to understand our participant’s constituting meanings and their structures 
accounting for their experience of the phenomenon, as lived by the participant 
(Davidson, 2003, p. 100).  
 It could be said that the main task of the researcher employing this method is 
to make explicit those meanings that even if implicit in the participant’ s’ narrative, 
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highly characterize it. How do we practically identify these implicit but highly 
characterizing aspects and make them emerge from the narratives gathered? 
 The answer to this question is intrinsically related with the third and final step 
of Davidson’s (2003) method, the transcendental reduction (Husserl, 1970).  
 
2.1.4. The transcendental reduction 
Why to bother and involve into the discussion such a controversial concept as the 
“transcendental”? Is not phenomenology primarily concerned with the worldly 
unfolding of experiences? And furthermore and most importantly, did not authorities 
such Giorgi (1970), Merleau-Ponty (2002) and Ricoeur (1966) claim that the 
transcendental is an exclusive domain of philosophy? 
 However, Davidson (2003, p. 109) argues that the transcendental reduction is 
of central concern in conducting research in the social sciences because it allows to 
account for subjective experiences as arising from a shared world and thus to gain 
access to someone else’s experiences and their meanings.  
 The phenomenological position proposed throughout this thesis, and on 
which the method discussed is rooted, claims that each individual is both an 
embodied being that exists on the ground of a shared world and at the same time the 
meaning maker of her personal world exactly on the ground of her inhabiting that 
very same world. Thus, the subjective experiences collected and analyzed by the 
researcher, in contrast to most other qualitative approaches that on this aspect remain 
vague and thus subject to criticisms, are not understood as arising from within the 
highly subjective, close and inaccessible individual’s experience. On the contrary, 
the subjective experiences collected and analyzed are understood as arising from the 
very same shared world the person inhabits with her fellows human beings.  
 Now we are ready to tackle the issue pertaining to how we are to gain access 
to somebody else’s experience. Although discussing the transcendental is of higher 
relevance within philosophical debates, it here serves the purpose of underlining that 
the transcendental is intersubjective in nature. In fact, the transcendental is the bridge 
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between a person’s experience of something and the experiences of the other. For 
example, we do not experience this world as our own world, different from the one 
others experience, but rather as a world that is cohabited by them (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002). As underlined by Davidson, “We are always already connected to others by 
virtue of sharing in an experiential reality larger than ourselves” (2003, p. 116).  
 Thus, the transcendental reduction allows us to propose an alternative 
understanding of subjectivity, not as something partial, closed, incidental. It 
establishes intersubjectivity as the realm where to locate the constitution of the real, 
that as we have seen, is never merely an individual concern. Thus transcendental 
intersubjectivity, universally structured as goal-directed emphasizes motivation as 
the teleological structure of the psychical world (Husserl, 1970; 1989).  
 Finally after we have recognized the intersubjective nature of even the 
seemingly most subjective experiences, how are we to uncover the functioning of the 
law of motivation as it is at play in the experiences of the research participants? 
 
2.1.5. Understanding the informants  
The key issue here, in order to uncover the functioning of the law of motivation as it 
is at play in the experiences of the research participants, is the one of understanding 
our informants. This is primarily possible thanks to empathy (Davidson, 2003), 
defined in phenomenological terms as a direct perception of the meanings expressed 
by the other, as an intentionality directed towards the other´s intentionality. As the 
philosopher Dan Zahavi (2010, p. 291) expresses it: 
 “Empathy is a basic, irreducible, form of intentionality that is directed 
towards the experiences of others. It is a question of understanding other 
experiencing subjects. But this doesn’t entail that the other’s experience is literally 
transmitted to us. Rather, it amounts to experiencing, say, the other person’s emotion 
without being in the corresponding emotional state yourself”.  
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 Hence the researcher accesses the informant’s experience directly, simply 
being present to the other’s expressive unity, defined as the unity between mind and 
body, or as an embodied mind (Scheler, 1954, pp. 218, 261; Zahavi, 2010, p. 292).  
 In fact, it is thanks to our ability to readily embrace the other as she is given 
to us through her expressive unity that we can access, not only what appears (e.g., 
behaviorist reading), but its underlying lived meanings (e.g., phenomenological 
reading). Thus the phenomenological notions of empathy and expressive unity are 
useful conceptual tools in underlying both the empathic understanding occurring 
between the interviewer and the informants, and the one occurring in the therapeutic 
encounter, between social workers and clients. However, although there are 
similarities between the attitude and ability of the interviewer to be fully focused on 
the unfolding of the interview, and the therapist attention toward her clients, and 
even considering that interviews may reveal cathartic moments, there is a qualitative 
difference among the two (Davidson, 2003).  
 
2.2. Final considerations on the method and methodology 
Summarizing and simplifying the discussion presented in the previous paragraphs, it 
could be said that the three main steps of Davidson’s (2003) method are in turn: first, 
defining the field of interest of the researcher, namely social workers’ experiences of 
mindfulness and MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders; second, 
accounting exclusively for the social workers’ experiences, bracketing one’s own 
preconceptions, judgments and assumptions about the phenomenon investigated and 
the experience of the informants; third, accessing and understanding social worker’s 
experiences, thanks to our empathic understanding, namely our ability to be present 
to the other and her expressive unity, thus considering the other’s experiences not as 
an inaccessible individual’s experience but as arising from a very specific contextual 
dimension, which is in turn rooted in the same world we all share. 
 Furthermore, it is important to stress how the phenomenological approach 
adopted here is not only able to fruitfully account for the interaction between 
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researcher and informants, but it is a useful tool in understanding the interactions 
between social workers and clients. In fact, as we will explore in part II, 
phenomenology offers itself as an ideal theoretical tool box to investigate the 
relationship between social workers and clients within the framework of mindfulness 
and MBIs and the practical unfolding of mindfulness in the treatment of substance 
use disorders. 
 Finally the employment of this phenomenological approach allows to explore 
on empirical basis the relation between Buddhist philosophy and persons-oriented 
health-care facilities in the treatment of substance use disorders, thus fostering the 
inclusion of first-person, experience-based perspectives within the Western approach 
to knowledge production. In fact, considering how the mainstream approach to the 
study of mindfulness and its clinical application have been criticized for not being 
theoretically and methodologically sound as it is based on substantially divergent 
epistemological assumptions (Gethin, 2011; Grossman &Van Dam, 2011), the 
employment of the phenomenological design proposed, based on first-person, 
experience-based perspectives allows to investigate the phenomenon from its own 
vantage point (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007). 
 However, the main strengths of the approach embraced in this thesis, namely 
the employment of first-person, experienced-based perspectives and its philosophical 
and theoretical roots in phenomenology represents also its main limitations. The 
terminology that phenomenological philosophy provides is on the one hand a useful 
tool in further mapping the still relatively unexplored field of inquiry of mindfulness, 
but on the other challenges the reader that is not familiar with this tradition. I believe 
that the benefits deriving from the choice of this particular research design overcome 
the limitations that it brings with itself.  
 
2.3. Data Collection and ethical considerations 
In order to answer a research question with any qualitative method it is necessary to 
select participants that have the knowledge the researcher is aiming to access and that 
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are willing to share it with her. In these regards Davidson’s (2003) phenomenological 
research method is not different. 
 In accordance with my research question Swedish practitioners employed in 
the field of substance use disorders’ treatment working with MBIs have been 
contacted. The first informant has been contacted via email, after having found the 
contact online. Snow-ball sampling has then been employed relying on the 
informants’ professional networks. The choice of interviewing Swedish practitioners 
was influenced by several factors. Firstly, there is a growing interest in the Swedish 
health-care landscape concerning the role MBIs (Sundquist et al., 2015), and 
specifically mindfulness in social work (Hilte, 2014) and substance disorders 
treatment (Franke, 2014). Secondly, at the moment of my writing I am not aware of 
any study that specifically focuses on the treatment of substance use disorders with 
MBIs in the Swedish context accounting for practitioners’ experiences.  Thirdly, I 
have a pre-existing knowledge of the Swedish system of treatment of substance 
consumers, since I have been working on this issue before (Di Placido, forthcoming; 
Guidi & Di Placido, 2015). Thus  I have noticed the contrast between the overall 
Swedish approach to substance use and substance treatment and the philosophical 
roots of mindfulness and MBIs.  
 This pre-existing knowledge is primarily oriented towards a macro and meso 
levels of analysis, namely on the Swedish welfare system, the organizational 
structure of public services for treatment of substance consumption,  Swedish  drug 
policy and its ideological framework of reference. Consequently, thanks to this 
understanding of the macro and meso dimensions of the Swedish system of 
substance disorders treatment, I could easily contextualize the micro level of analysis 
of this work, namely the social worker-client relationship, within its organizational 
and institutional frameworks.  
 From a review of the Swedish landscape of services for substance use 
disorders treatment performed at the purpose of this thesis it appeared that mainly 
three types of interventions for substance use disorders are provided in the Swedish 
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context:12-steps program, CBT and Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT). Only 
a few facilities in Sweden offer MBIs for the treatment of substance use disorders, 
although them being an alternative to traditional treatment methods (Bowen et al., 
2009) and their underlying ideologies (e.g., Bayles, 2014; Global  Commission  on  
Drug  Policy,  2011; 2014; Marlatt, 2002). 
 Considering that very few people work with mindfulness and MBIs in the 
treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context, very limited  
biographical information is displayed in order to guarantee participants’ anonymity. 
It is enough to state that all the participants at the moment of the interviews were 
employed in the field of substance use disorders treatment and worked with 
mindfulness and MBIs among other treatment methods. All the informants have had 
several years of mindfulness practices such as Yoga and meditation and have 
received training in MBIs such as MBSR, MBCT and MBRP. Furthermore, all the 
facilities where they were employed at the moment of the interviews offered MBIs 
and in particular MBRP for less than a decade.   
 All the interviews have been performed in English between early February 
2015 to April 2015. This research involved 5 informants for a total of 5 interviews, of 
which one a double interview and one a follow-up interview with an informant 
already interviewed. The final interview protocol was composed by only three open-
ended questions: How would you describe a good therapeutic relationship? How can 
mindfulness contribute to a good therapeutic relationship according to your 
professional experience? Can you give an example from your professional practice of 
the main advantages of working with MBIs in the treatment of substance use 
disorders?  
 The duration of the interviews varied between a minimum of 49 minutes to a 
maximum of 68.  
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 Although the interviews were carried out in English neither the participants 
nor the researcher were English native speakers, and some minor language editing 
has been done to the interviews in order to facilitate their reading.  
 To conclude this section a final clarification in line with the method chosen 
has to be done. I am myself a practitioners of mindfulness, in particular mindfulness 
meditation and Yoga. My first encounter with these practices is dated a few years 
back thanks to my mother’s encouragement to explore Yoga. Yet it was only 
subsequently, around one year ago that I developed a daily practice in the attempt to 
cope with stress, anxiety and depression. In the beginning I primarily relied on a vast 
array of material available on line and on some of the material employed in this thesis 
(e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 2005; Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Kabat-Zinn, 2007), 
beside the support of a friend with over a decade of experience of meditation practice. 
My personal, first-hand experience of the effectiveness of mindfulness and MBIs is 
very positive.  
 However, in line with the purpose of this thesis, and according to the second 
step of the method employed, namely the “phenomenological-psychological 
reduction” (Husserl, 1970, p. 235), I attempted to suspend my pre-understanding of 
mindfulness and MBIs, thus merely accounting for practitioners’ accounts.  
 Yet, if as emphasized by Merleau-Ponty (1962) and the later Husserl (1970) a 
total reduction is never achievable, how to relate with the aspects of our own 
experience of the phenomenon investigated that we fail to skillfully bracket? 
 In fact at times I found myself identifying with the informants’ narratives 
although the results of this thesis are not based on my personal experience but on the 
ones of the practitioners. A solution to this apparent conflict was found in bringing 
into awareness my assumptions and pre-understanding rather than ignoring them, 
allowing me to clearly distinguish between my own experience and the informants’ 
ones.  
 Recognizing how a total reduction is an impossible task, subjective 
experiences play a major role in defining how a person relates with a particular 
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phenomenon. In other words, rather than ignoring these personal biographical 
instances I deliberately brought them into discussion, in a manner that allowed me to 
see my positioning toward both substance consumption and more specifically 
mindfulness practices. For instance, accounting for the latter, I posed myself 
questions such as: what does it mean for me to practice Yoga and meditations? What 
are the expectations I have toward the informants’ narratives? What are the results I 
expect to find considering my experience with mindful practices?    
 An honest and mindful recognition of my positioning in relation to the 
answers to these questions has been in constant dialogue with the empirics gathered 
in the attempt to clearly distinguish the former from the latter. Hence it is clear how 
both my own experience and the informants’ share an understanding of mindfulness 
as transcending the boundaries of a mere clinical intervention and regard mindfulness 
in very positive terms. However, the informants still approached their experiences 
primarily from the perspective of practitioners working with mindfulness and MBIs, 
and I approached the encounter with them as a researcher interested in hearing about 
it. Yet, I am perfectly aware that the engagement with mindfulness that the 
informants and I share helped to create a bond that facilitated the access to rich 
narratives that otherwise may not have been reached.  
 
3. Social work in context 
 As previously underlined, any experience is always arising within a specific cultural, 
social and political context, and thus is historically grounded. The same is true for the 
experiences of the informants of this thesis.  In these regards it is important to 
consider the informants and their narratives not as arising in a social vacuum, but as 
embedded in a very particular socio-political context.  
 In fact social  work  theories, practices and methodologies  always inhabit  
and  promote  certain  discourses even when they claim to be ideologically free 
(Carey  & Foster , 2013). For instance, as underlined by Carey and Foster (2013), the 
role of science, neo-liberalism and professionalism, three different facades of our 
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Western rationalist stance (Scholte, 2005), highly influence both professional and 
academic social work.  
 The next section provides a short overview on two complementary aspects 
that characterize the overall Swedish discourse on substance use and substance 
disorders treatment. They are the discussion between disease models and choice 
models of addiction and on a zero tolerance approach to substance use and treatment. 
In particular regarding the latter it is argued that MBIs’ non-judgmental, accepting 
and compassionate features display as a plausible alternative stance to substance use 
disorders treatment, if compared to traditional treatment methods and their underlying 
ideological reference.  
3. 1. Mindfulness and MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders: an   
alternative approach? 
This section introduces the main accounts of substance use and how they relate to 
both the Swedish drug policy and social work practice. In order to better understand 
the therapeutic encounter between clients and social workers in the field of substance 
use disorders treatment, and thus its implications,  it  is fundamental  to  consider the 
socio-political context in which it takes place.   
 Substance use can be addressed through the lens of biochemical and 
neurological perspectives or in psycho-sociological terms. Susanne Uusitalo, Mikko 
Salmela and Janne Nikkinen (2013) frame such a distinction in terms of disease and 
choice models of addiction. 
 In the first case, the disease model of addiction, what is at stake are the 
biochemical processes that the substances activate in the bodies of the consumers.  
The consumers are seen as passive, dictated by the substance they need in order to 
keep a sustainable  biochemical  balance.  This implies the possibility to measure the  
nature and the quality of the biochemical or neurological processes involved,  
drawing on a cause-effect understanding  (e.g., if one assumes the substance Y the 
hormone H is produced and in the long run the production of another hormone X is 
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inhibited, leading to dependency, mood switches, etc.),  confining the problem to the 
individuals and to the substances themselves. A causally reductionist idea is then  
enforced, where addiction is depicted as a chronic medical illness (Uusitalo, Salmela 
&Nikkinen, 2013, p. 35).  
 The disease model of addiction still dominates many national policies and 
treatment methods (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011;2014) and in line with 
this model, the mainstream attitude towards substance use and substance users is to 
understand the first as a cause of biochemical changes in the body structure of the 
second. If we account for this “medical” perspective, the individuals are seen just as 
somebody to fix, since not functioning correctly anymore because of biochemical 
imbalances induced by the substances. Here the individuals lose their status as 
conscious  subjects, able  to choose if to use or abuse substances and thus they are 
seen as mere objects, passively influenced by the biochemical changes in their body. 
 This model and its practical implications are based on a certain political, 
ideological and  methodological
12
 assumptions: that the production, sale, possession 
and consumption of illegal substances should be criminalized (Global Commission on 
Drug Policy, 2014). Consequently substance use disorders have to be faced by (a) the  
attempt to reestablish the normal biomedical and neurological balance through  
medications and (b) preventing access to narcotics (Goldberg, 2001, p. 1299). 
 Accounting for the second perspective, namely the choice models of 
addiction, substance consumption appears to be a more complex phenomenon, arising 
from the interplay between  individual and socio-environmental factors. However, 
accounting for a psycho-sociological understanding does not mean to deny the 
valuable contribution of biomedical and neurological accounts,  as  Susanne  Uusitalo 
and colleagues (2013) clearly argue.   
 However, the major implication of the choice models of addiction for the 
social work relationship is to switch the attention from the substance and its 
                                                          
12
 In the sense of which treatment methods are implemented and how. 
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consumption to the person and her lived meanings. It rests on the assumption that in 
order to understand  the  meanings  of  substance  taking  within  a  certain  historical  
and  biographical  context,  and to facilitate its cessations through the most suitable 
treatment methods, social  workers have to primarily listen to their clients´ narratives 
and life experiences. 
 This shift of perspective is particularly important considering how social  
work  practices  inhabit  and  promote  certain  discourses  (Carey  & Foster , 2013).  
In  fact  social  work  theories,  methodologies  and  practices  even  when  claimed  
to  be ideologically neutral are situated and arise from a very particular discourse,   
understood as self-referential body of knowledge which aims to legitimize its 
propositions on the assumption of their truthfulness  (Foucault, 2000).  
 The Global Commission on Drug Policy
13
, a forum of internationally 
recognized experts in the field, which aims at increasing awareness about alternative 
approaches to mainstream drug policy and consequent treatment methods, offers a 
valuable contribution to the discussion at hand.  
  As underlined by the Commission “…many countries  [among which figures 
Sweden] still react to people dependent on drugs with punishment and stigmatization. 
In reality, drug dependence is a complex health condition that  has  a  mixture  of  
causes  –  social,  psychological  and  physical  (including,  for  example, harsh  living  
conditions,  or  a  history  of  personal  trauma  or  emotional  problems)”  (2011, p. 
6). 
 As further underlined by the Commission (2014, p. 11), substance use is not 
necessary problematic. In fact, as the data provided by United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC
14
) (2013), show only 10 per cent of people who use 
illegal substances globally are considered to be problematic users. Thus, the greatest 
                                                          
13
 For a detailed overview see http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/about/.  
14
 The UNODC defines ‘problem drug users’ as ‘those with drug use disorders or dependence’. 
UNODC (2013, p.) retrieved in 
www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf Accessed 16.04.15 
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part of substance users do not use substances in a problematic way, despite the fact 
that drug policy and treatment methods are based on a narrative on illegal substances 
as a major threat for society. 
 This seems to be very much the case in the Swedish context (e.g., Edman, 
2013; Edman, 2013a; Ekhendal, 2012). In fact the Swedish model has been used as 
an example by supporters of zero tolerance policy for it unequivocally stands for a 
drug-free society (e.g., Hallam, 2010; Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Affairs  2011; 
UNODC, 2006).  
 As previously mentioned stigmatization and punishment towards consumers 
are among the most damaging consequences of zero tolerance approaches (Global 
Commission on Drug Policy, 2011, p. 6). Such a focus on consumers has practical 
repercussions on the treatment methods employed (Global Commission on Drug 
Policy, 2014).  With specific reference to Sweden it brings about the enforcement of 
abstinence upon the recalcitrant consumers rather than promoting harm-reduction 
measures specifically aimed at the management of the consequences of the use.  
 Swedish drug policy is historically constructed within the framework of a zero 
tolerance ideology (e.g., Edman, 2013; Edman & Stenius, 2014; Ekendhal, 2012) thus 
being prohibiting in character and further fostering the implementation of coercive 
treatments, within a paternalistic approach (e.g., Hallam, 2010; Edman & Stenius, 
2014; Moore, Fraser, Törrönen & Eriksson Tinghög, 2015).Yet such a stance it is not 
considered in punitive terms by its advocates, but as underlined by Hallam “…rather  
as providing protection, assistance and support…” ( 2010, p. 3).  
 Furthermore, as underlined by previous research (Ekendahl, 2012), even when 
the general zero tolerance stance is enlarged to embrace harm-reduction measures, it 
is done according to a very restrictive vision of harm reduction measures, 
substantially based on methadone or buprenorphine treatments as in the case of 
heroin treatment. Hence the harm-reduction measures employed in the Swedish 
context, mainly based on medication, contribute to reproduce an understanding of 
substance consumption in line with the disease model of addiction, which as we have 
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discussed, stands for a limited understanding of substance users and their life 
situations.   
 MBIs, and in particular MBPR, figure as harm-reduction measures that in line 
with the overall recommendations of the Global Commission on Drug Policy (2014) 
are not so much oriented toward avoiding consumption and treatment with 
medication, but on ameliorate the lives of the consumers (Bayles, 2014). Hence, 
contrary to mainstream interventions, within the framework of MBRP relapses are 
considered not as failures but as parts of the recovery process, contributing to dismiss 
moralism, shame, idealism, and judgment towards substance consumers standing thus 
in opposition with the war on drugs and its zero tolerance ideology (e.g., Bayles, 
2014; Global  Commission  on  Drug  Policy,  2011; 2014; Marlatt, 2002).    
  Part II of this thesis will thus attempt, among the rest, to underline the 
plausible role of mindfulness and MBIs in providing a practical alternative stance to 
the treatment of substance consumers and their underlying ideological reference. 
 
Part II 
 
1. Analysis and discussion  
This part of the thesis presents the empirics gathered, my analysis and discussion. 
The empirics are systematized accounting for the recurrent themes emerged in the 
participant’s narratives as suggested by Davidson’s (2003) method. Furthermore, the 
empirics are discussed in relation to the conceptual tools and the issues presented in 
Part I of the thesis. In other words the three tensions identified and summarized in 
table 1 (p. 8) will be explored in the light of the empirical material. Part II ends with 
presenting the conclusions drawn from this work and suggesting a few plausible 
directions for future research. 
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1.1. Mindfulness at work: bridging the gap between theory and practice  
According to the current state of research on mindfulness and in particular on its 
application in the social work field, mindfulness is shown to contribute in a variety of 
ways to the improvement of the therapeutic work (e.g., Brenner, 2009; Hilte, 2014; 
Wong, 2013).  However,  there is a lack of research regarding how this advantages 
practically takes place (Birnbaum & Birnbaum, 2008; Gockel, et al., 2013).  
 Thus this  section attempts to fill this research gap relying on the analysis of 
the narratives gathered, answering to the following questions: how is the therapeutic 
relationship understood and characterized in a mindfulness based intervention? How 
can mindfulness contribute to the creation, development and cultivation of the 
therapeutic relationships? 
 Let me start with a short presentation on how the informants perceive and 
describe a good therapeutic relationship. 
 
 it is based on trust, that both parts feel that they can trust each other and that 
they can tell staff that is difficult of course…Here I can feel always that they come 
back, that they call me, even if they have taken a relapse, they call me, they want to 
come back, they are not afraid, or maybe they are afraid and ashamed but they still 
come and want to try. For me this is the relationship that is good (interview 2).  
 
 it is about caring a lot, that we are all humans…So that’s about being human, 
so we share a lot with the emphasis on the client of course (interview 1). 
 
 A good therapeutic relationship. My ground thinking about this is that when I 
meet a client we are two sciences who meet together. Because I know the theories and 
the methods…but the client I meet he is the professional of his life. And this is my 
ground thinking, that I can’t tell you what to do because I don’t know how you are or 
what you are. And you have to have a relationship. It’s the most important thing in 
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the therapy of all. [The relationship] takes out all theories…you have to validate your 
clients, you have to see them, you have to respect them (interview 5).  
 
 From the narratives gathered there emerges a certain continuity of contents, 
namely the centrality of the relationship with the clients. This may be framed in terms 
of trust, as in the case of the first fragment; in terms of the common human ground 
shared by the therapist and the client, as in the second narrative; and finally in terms 
of autonomy and expertise of the clients over their own lives, as in the third case. In 
more recent years the therapeutic relationship has been addressed as the most 
transformative aspect of the therapeutic process, thus transcending clinicians’ 
orientations and treatment methods (e.g., Giorgi, 2005; Howe 2008, Turner, 2009).  
 How is the employment of mindfulness of use in the process of building a 
trustful relationship, that transcends the therapist-client roles and foster the client’s 
will?  
 The informants in the following fragments describe how, thanks to the 
inhabiting of central mindfulness features such as acceptance, non-judgment and 
compassion the therapist is able to competently work with her own emotional-
cognitive world in a manner that prevents burn out and work related stress, to foster 
the establishment of a solid ground with the client. These findings are in line with a 
broad range of studies that specifically underline how mindfulness may help social 
work students and practitioners to consciously embrace their own emotional and 
cognitive experiences, favoring the ability to be present in the experiences of their 
clients in turn and prevent work related stress (e.g., Gockel,  et al., 2013; Hilte, 2014; 
Wong, 2013).    
 
 But in my daily work it makes me more calm when I am in a session and more 
aware of what is going on and more focused. But of course I have days when I can do 
a lots of Yoga and nothing of this will happen (informant laughs) to me, because it is 
a shitty day or something. So for me it’s just a way of being with myself. I mean we 
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work with people that have very difficult situations in life and I have family and kids 
and I have to be there for them too and I need it [mindfulness] to like rest myself from 
what I experience here and when I come home and the other side around too, with 
conflicts and stuff going on with kids and just, ok this there, and this is now. So for 
me it is more a way of treating myself, of taking care of myself in this work I am 
doing with people (interview 2). 
 
 Such an awareness of one’s cognitive and emotional world may also be what 
allows the therapists to avoid interpretations and judgments toward their own 
cognitive and emotional world and the client’s experiences. Thus the concept of 
phenomenological-psychological reduction (Husserl, 1970, p. 235) discussed in Part I 
is a useful tool in theorizing what the participants describe as gaining awareness, 
which in fact entails an open attitude, freed from interpretation and judgment.  Let us 
turn to the therapist narrative in what follows.  
  
 It’s really important for me to observe my reactions. For all therapists in 
some way. Because it affects the relationships with the clients…so then I have to 
know my thoughts here and be aware of them and not judging and doing 
interpretations. 
Interviewer: So we have to put, do you mean to fully understand the clients you have 
to put aside your judgments and interpretations and see what is for the client like?  
Informant: I can’t get rid of them. But just to know that they are there, because there 
is, always, always. So. Just to be aware (interview 4).  
 
 As explored in Part I discussing the phenomenological-psychological 
reduction, a total reduction is never possible (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Husserl, 1970). 
What is possible is to bring into awareness our pre-assumptions, judgments and 
expectations. This process is substantially the same for the researcher in relation to 
her informants and the phenomenon studied as noticed discussing the method, and for 
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the therapists in relation to the clients and their own emotional and cognitive life, as 
the empirics confirm.  
 However, can we identify other ways besides the fostering of practitioners’ 
awareness, in which mindfulness unfolds within the therapeutic relationship?  
 Analyzing the following fragment  in phenomenological terms, it could be 
said that the grounding in the present was obtained due to joint mindful exercises, 
which helps to highlight the shift from the natural attitude to the personal attitude 
(Husserl, 1970), emphasizing how clients and practitioners gain access to each 
other’s phenomenal realms, or in other words how they can be present to each others’ 
experiences. 
 
 Interviewer: I would like to ask you if you could recall an example from your 
professional practice on how mindfulness contributed to this therapeutic relationship 
let say? 
Informant: I don’t know if I can pin point something, but it’s more then when I do 
interventions that are mindful, if you do an exercise, like a body scan or whatever, 
when I do it with clients we do this exercise and afterword we are much closer 
together, and we are much more genuine, both of us…So this I can notice, even if in 
the beginning I can feel like, oh maybe not this client, this won’t work, I mean almost 
always [mindfulness] adds this, not relax maybe but  more here sense of, this here 
sensation and more genuine. And also that I am here, I am doing the same. It is not 
that I am doing this stuff to you and you are sitting there and something happens to 
you. So, and this I notice almost every time I do a [mindfulness] exercise with 
someone. That we become closer and it is easier to talk (interview 2). 
 
 Thus the therapeutic involvement of mindfulness fosters the encounter 
between client and practitioner thanks to the shared commitment arising out of 
practicing mindfulness together.  
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 The same informant further underlines that even though not all the clients 
always engage in all the mindfulness exercises that the MBRP manual suggests, they 
still gain a new perspective over their life and over themselves. Again, this is in line 
with the current literature on mindfulness where with time and practice, an attitudinal 
shift in the life of its practitioners is recognized to occur (e.g., Bowen, Chawla, & 
Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Witkiewitz et al., 2013b). This may signify, as in 
the case of the social work clients, being able to relate to the source of their distress, 
being it addiction, anxiety or anything else, with a renewed, more open attitude. 
   
 …we are always so surprised that even though they are hardly doing their 
homework,  hardly practicing these exercise, almost just practicing when they are 
meeting us once a week, it still makes a huge difference for them! And that it makes a 
difference in the long run somehow. It is not just that here and now they stop to take 
drugs or whatever, it’s also this way of thinking of themselves that I feel they really 
need to be able to do the change and keep the change somehow. So, when I do 
exercise with people and I feel they understand in a deeper level, somehow, that’s 
what I think is one of the main things about it.  
 
 Framing the analysis relying on Husserl’s (1970) distinction between the 
natural attitude and the personal attitude emphasizes how mindfulness’ practitioners, 
whether they are clients or therapists, thanks to the observational stance and the 
suspension of judgment required by mindfulness exercises as included in MBIs (e.g., 
Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 
2002) gain access to their phenomenal realm, understood as the realm of experience 
as experienced, in a renewed manner. When one is able to access one’s own 
experience in a more open, non-judgmental and direct manner, the chance to 
recognize reactive and automatic tendencies and substitute them with skillful 
responses is then made available to the person.  
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 Moreover, there is a further contribution that mindfulness and MBIs seem to 
add to the work with substance users, especially if compared with treatment as usual. 
The inclusion of mindfulness seems to help to foster the ability of the clients to stay 
with the source of their distress, just observing it, as also previously pointed out by 
some (e.g., Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal, Williams & 
Teasdale, 2002). 
 
 We teach other practitioners RP and what I see is the problem with this stance 
is somehow that you always talk about what you should do…Super good thing, but 
the problems that they are not focusing on is the stopping! To stop and stay there! 
That’s the biggest quest somehow. And I think mindfulness is just working on that 
spot a lot! To just stop and stay and then anything can happen afterword, or around 
them or whatever but it’s just this… so I think this mindfulness for RP is really about 
this point of stopping, or even if you are working with aggression or something, some 
feelings or sensation or emotion that is really strong that you need to catch in the 
movement, ok how you do it? It does not help me if I know I am a good problem 
solver over here, I need it now! And how do I do this? So I feel mindfulness works 
really good and with this compassion, that it’s ok feeling angry or upset or bad about 
yourself, that you didn’t stop earlier, whatever. This is the main thing for me at least 
(interview 2). 
  
 In summary, the main contribution of mindfulness and MBI in the therapeutic 
relationship and in the treatment of substance use disorders that emerged in this 
section regards both the establishment and development of a stronger therapeutic 
alliance and a substantially different approach to one’s own experience in general and 
source of distress in particular. Furthermore, the phenomenological reading proposed 
attempts  to catch these points as they unfold in the clinical practice and contrary to 
the mainstream study of mindfulness it provides conceptual tools attuned on first-
person, experience-based inquiries. Thus the phenomenological approach proposed 
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not only contributes to fill the research gap previously underlined but provides an 
alternative methodology for the study of mindfulness in its clinical applications.  
 
1.2. Another way of knowing: bodies back in business 
Bringing into the discussion the body is as an unavoidable part of this thesis. In this 
section it will be shown and discussed how one of the main contributions of 
mindfulness and MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish 
context is related to the role of the body as the main tool to understand oneself. Thus, 
the tension previously identified between first-person, experience-based perspectives 
found in Buddhism and phenomenology, and third-person perspectives, 
characterizing our traditional Western take on knowledge, is in fact a fruitful 
platform in which to contextualize the discussion at hand.  
 However, let me start by introducing a fragment in which the participant 
states that when she integrates mindfulness in her therapeutic practice the clients 
seem to gain a deeper understanding of their life situations, an understanding that is 
not merely cognitive. Thus the clients  are making sense of their situations in an 
experienced based manner, where the body, as much as the mind, is the place where 
life unfolds. From this vantage point the bodies of the clients are primarily 
psychological bodies, where their emotional and cognitive world manifest and can be 
accessed. In other words, the body, besides entering within the domain of the 
therapeutic encounter as an unavoidable tool, becomes the primary medium through 
which knowledge can be accessed. 
 
  It is more a sensation that they understand with everything in their body. Not 
just their head. And this almost always comes the time afterword, when I see them 
next time. So I always ask, did you see any, did anything follow you during the week 
from the things we talked about? They say, yeah, this thing, is just settling in the 
body. So sometimes I feel like in therapy you can talk the stuff, and it’s not really 
working, so instead of talking just doing it, makes it, they internalize  it in another 
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way that makes it more, more potent, quicker, more real for them somehow, and then 
that it connects with something that they understand from themselves…And I am 
always surprised. Shouldn’t he, like explain what happened or something? But it is 
not necessary. It’s there (informant laughs)(interview 2). 
   
 Thus, according to the practitioner, an experienced-based, first-person 
perspective provides the clients with a direct and effective way to face the challenges 
they undergo, which is reported in the literature as well (e.g., Bowen, Chawla, & 
Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Witkiewitz et al., 2013b). An example of how 
mindfulness is practically employed in the process of bringing clients’ bodies within 
their field of awareness, is provided by an informant in the next fragment: 
 
 ... when they are going to the wood and first they do a breathing exercise, can 
you feel your body, can you feel what’s happening? And now we are going to train in 
the wood, when you walk in the wood, what do you feel under the ground? How is the 
ground? What do you hear? What do you smell? What do you see? And try to stay in 
that place and they walk and then H and Z ask them a few questions again, and the 
clients feel that it helped, it’s nice. And H and Z can see the difference before they 
went out in the wood and when they come back. (interview 5). 
 
 Here the informant unveils the importance of deliberately directing attention 
towards their perceptive sensory experiences in an open and non-judgmental manner, 
in order to break the ruminative cycles that are causing the clients’ distress.  Such a 
role of mindfulness’ experienced-based, first-person perspective in breaking 
ruminative cycles is supported by the findings of current research on the neurological 
mechanisms of mindfulness (e.g., Hölzel et al., 2011; Shapiro, et al., 2006; 
Witkiewitz, Lustyk & Bowen, 2013), by leading evidence-based  clinical research 
(e.g., Baer, 2011; Bowen & Enkema, 2014; Witkiewitz et al., 2013a), and finally by 
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the main MBIs manuals (e.g., Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 
Segal, William & Teasdale, 2002). 
 However, such a focus on an experienced-based, first-person perspective is 
not merely of concern for the clients. It is also helpful for the therapists themselves. 
As the informant underlines, when training other social workers in RP she manages to 
transcend the mere cognitive components of this method including some mindfulness 
in her teachings. As a result of the integration of mindfulness she teaches other 
practitioners to assume the observational stance that characterizes this approach. 
 
 Yes. So RP, that’s a good example…So when I do that I use the body more. So 
I can do like a small meditation but I don’t call it meditation, just to feel like what’s 
good about being sober, just to get them from the head down to their body and heart, 
because it’s very important. But usually when you work with RP many group leaders, 
they are afraid to talk about the body. And of course because they don’t have the 
experience themselves with mindfulness perhaps, but I think it is an important link. 
And during training me and X are doing more mindfulness, but it’s really a RP 
training, but we use mindfulness like staying when they [the therapists] feel 
uncomfortable and the client is not ready to change anything but they [the therapists] 
want to hurry and find the solution to this. So we use mindfulness just to stop and 
observe their own thoughts (Interview 4). 
 
 Thus the inclusion of mindfulness in regular RP training supports the 
therapists in gaining the ability to face the unease intrinsic in certain therapeutic 
encounters, when the clients do not seem to gain much out of the intervention. As 
underlined by Bayles (2014) there are growing evidences of the positive impact that 
mindfulness has in therapeutic protocols such as CBT and RP. Moreover, the 
informant provides a short example on how she attempts to guide the social workers 
attending the training to gain a growing awareness of their bodies.  
 
43 
 
 …one of the participants was really talking, really wanted to know in 
theoretical way about RP. Why, tell me what to do. So I just said we will get back to 
that but for now can I ask you what it feels like? Well, I am really confused. Where do 
you feel this confusion? And she was really, what a strange question. But she could 
feel it here [the informant pinpoints her chest]. So just as an example what we can do 
in a group…to use the body instead of trying to explain and know everything 
(interview 4).   
 
 Hence, working with mindfulness provides a new way of accessing 
experiences, thanks to the observational stance towards one’s own experiential field, 
being it cognitive, emotional or perceptual. In fact, as emerges in the following 
fragment the mindful practitioner seems to struggle less in order to understand her 
clients and thus manages to be fully present to the other.  
 
 …still I know in a group when someone is really restless, really struggling. 
They don’t have to say, but still I know…So sitting with clients, sometimes I feel what 
they feel. So I think that’s [something] everybody can do it, but you need to notice it 
and practice it…So it is asking in a very intuitive way. So it’s really 
fascinating…when I need the information or knowledge, it comes to me (interview 4). 
 
 What at a first reading may be regarded as a mystical perspective toward 
understanding the other, in reality addresses a central capacity of humans, which is 
our ability for empathy. Such an ability allows the practitioners to fully understand 
her clients just being present to their expressive unity (Scheler, 1954, pp. 218, 261; 
Zahavi, 2010, p. 292) and it is thanks to this ability to readily embrace the other as 
she is given to us through her expressive unity that the therapist can access, not only 
what appears, but its underlying lived meanings (Englander, 2014). 
 In this section the link between the phenomenological position embraced in 
this thesis and contemplative traditions such as Buddhism emerges, especially in 
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relation to their take on the body. In fact, contrary to the dominant western rationalist 
approach to knowledge, they both consider experiences as bodily and thus 
subjectively inhabited by the experiencer to be the primarily step in the process of 
knowledge acquisition.  
 Such an experience-based, first-person perspective has been also proven by 
previous studies to provide effective treatment when working with substance users 
(Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010) and further allows to reflectively detect 
mindfulness at work as one’s awareness is increasingly the stable object of one’s 
attention. 
 
1.3. They say I don’t judge them  
 It has been argued that one of the main contributions of mindfulness and MBIs in the 
treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context is the compassionate, 
accepting and non-judgmental character of these interventions. Thus, the second 
tension identified in this thesis, between mainstream judging and stigmatizing 
approaches to substance use and substance disorders treatment and accepting and 
non-judgmental approaches informed by mindfulness is tackled in this section.  
 Features such as compassion, acceptance and non-judgment seem to be 
particularly important considering the overall approach to substance use and 
substance use disorders treatment characteristic of the Swedish context, and thus of 
extreme relevance when working with substance users. In fact this specific group 
typically suffer from social and institutional stigma, prejudice and judgment as 
underlined by the Global Commission on Drug Policy (2011; 2014). As an informant 
states, “… non judging is essential for working with these kind of people” (interview 
1).  
 For instance relying on the following exchange between the participant and 
the interviewer the compassionate, accepting and non-judgmental nature of 
mindfulness is detected at work within the context of the clinical encounter. 
According to the informant such features differentiate between her work as therapist 
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and the work of other practitioners, and this seems to be confirmed by the clients 
feedback.  
 
 …for me mindfulness is also this compassion thing flowing under everything, 
that makes a difference when I meet clients, from maybe other therapist…This is also 
the feedback I get from clients. I feel you are working for me, you are there for me. I 
mean, I guess everyone gets it but I sometimes I connect it with this compassionate, 
ok you felt bad, and that’s the way you felt so, this non-judgmental style… 
  
 The reader may wonder how this compassionate, accepting and non-
judgmental approach is practically unfolding in the encounter with the clients. In the 
following the interviewer attempts to access exactly this dimension: 
 
 Interviewer: So how would be a typical exchange with a client? Let say I am a 
client and I am telling you something related to my drug use, how would you respond 
to me? When you are working, how does this [compassionate, accepting and non-
judging style]in practice happen let say? How it goes in your words, in your way… 
 Participant:… I would just hear you out of course, and then, this is what we do 
all the time in therapeutic work, validate you but at the same time bringing up the 
stuff that is coming to you. When you are telling me something difficult, for instance I 
can’t deal with my anxiety. So ok, you feel anxiety is a problem for you, ok you have a 
feeling that you have difficulties in dealing with anxiety. I make it more like, ok, here 
are you and there is your anxiety, but you are not the same. So trying to have this, 
this non-judgmental style, can sometimes sounds quite harsh, because it is like, oh 
you have a drug problem so! But it is not this way because you have this compassion 
going on that I can’t explain. So that’s what I am aware of, trying to make the 
separation somehow, ok that you are here, you are telling me that this is your 
problem (interview 2). 
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 The informant primarily stresses the importance to be present to the client and 
her experience. Such a reading is in line with the phenomenological discussion 
presented in Part I, where the concepts of empathy and expressive unity (Scheler, 
1954, pp. 218, 261; Zahavi, 2010, p. 292) underlines how a deliberate, open and non-
judgmental attention toward the other allows us to fully understand and empathize 
with them. 
 Furthermore, in the previous fragment it emerges how once the perceived 
problem is detected, the therapist needs to underline how the problem is not the 
person herself. In fact as underlined by MBIs manuals the consequence intrinsic in 
realizing that one is not the problem that troubles her or him has a transformative 
impact (e.g., Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal, William & 
Teasdale, 2002). Regularly inhabiting a space of non doing, of deliberate and non-
judgmental awareness of the present moment has in fact profound transformative and 
healing implications (Kabat-Zinn, 2005), meaning not that all our problems will 
disappear but that our relationship to these problems will drastically change. 
 How are the clients understanding the therapists’ suggestion to not identify 
themselves with their problem?  
   
 Interviewer: And the clients get that? For me it is easier to understand 
because I am into this as well, but does the client get you? 
Participant: I think in the beginning they don’t notice it. They are not aware of that 
they are noticing it. But as it stays around, as I keep on meeting someone then I start 
to address when they talked bad about themselves, so you have a self value there, that 
you are biting up yourself, how does that feel and make you feel? That they start 
learning this way of talking…So I think they learn while being in the sessions. If I feel 
that they in the beginning find it odd the way I talk, then I talk about it. That I am 
trying to make this, if you told yourself that you are this problem, it is a difference 
between being the problem or having the problem. So, but usually I don’t talk about 
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it, it feels like it is something they learn about, how this goes on. But it is very 
different from person to person of course (interview 2). 
 
 It is hence suggested that because of the mindfulness exercises and the 
guidance of the therapist the clients naturally gain an observational stance toward 
their problems. This is in line with the MBRP manual (Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 
2010) that underlines that the main task of MBIs is to gain a space of observation for 
the client over their own emotional and cognitive world, thus learning to competently 
relate to them with acceptance and non-judgment. The next fragment further explores 
the issue at hand: 
 
 You just need to be in an observing state, that’s ok, and that’s what I am 
trying to, actually that’s the only goal I have with my clients. Just to observe, they 
don’t have to do anything else but observe what happens, the thoughts and emotions. 
So that’s also compassion. Because you don’t have to do step 1, step 2, step 3 and be 
blissful and loving…Because something happens when you observe…And also 
compassion with just letting things come to you without an effort, also in meditation, 
not to be  lazy and fall asleep of course, but to, just sit, that’s all you have to do, just 
to sit. But I think that also is compassion: that you are ok just the way you are, also in 
meditation practice and also when I ask questions afterword they don’t have to say 
anything. If they think it’s hard to remember what happened so I just ask, how do you 
feel right now? What do you notice in your body or thoughts right now in this 
second? So just trying to help them, they don’t have to achieve anything, they don’t 
have to be good. It’s just the way it is (interview 2). 
 
 As underlined by Bayles in his review of the current literature on mindfulness 
application in the treatment of substance use disorders (2014) the accepting and non-
judging features of mindfulness and MBIs allow us to promote a stronger alliance 
with clients and thus further support behavioral goals and commitment. 
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Paradoxically, the therapist’s requirement of just observing seems to promote the 
client’s engagement in their own healing process. In fact, as several studies have 
pointed out (e.g., Bowen et al., 2009; Kelly, Stout & Slaymaker, 2012;Witkiewitz et 
al., 2013a), MBRP displays a dropout rate sensitively inferior to treatment as usual, 
such as the 12-steps approach, where the clients are required to commit to the 
accomplishing of certain established goals, such as total abstinence by the end of the 
treatment (Bayles, 2014). 
 Then considering the contextualization of traditional treatment methods 
within the framework of a disease model of addiction and zero tolerance ideology, as 
we discussed in the final section of Part I, it is not surprising that clients are reported 
to experience a sense of relief when meeting with therapists that work with 
mindfulness and MBIs.  
 
 A new client a month ago told me, the first time he met me, you don’t judge 
me! He was really surprised. And for me it’s more like, well why should I? But for 
him, he really meant it. I just told you, I took a very big relapse and people are 
suffering and you don’t judge me. You are really in the right place, he told me, 
working as a therapist (interview 1). 
 
 As mentioned earlier, in contrast to mainstream treatment methods, MBRP 
does not consider relapses as a failure, but as consistent part of the treatment process 
(e.g., Bayles, 2014; Bowen, Chawla & Marlatt, 2010; Marlatt, 2002).  
 Moreover, the same informant further stresses how cultivating a 
compassionate attitude supports the coping with the distress intrinsic in working with 
vulnerable people, and thus accepting their suffering without being automatically 
overwhelmed by it. 
 
 I remember before I started with more daily meditation I was more perhaps 
worried about the clients. And if they took a relapse I had more of a though like, Oh 
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no! Did he have to? But now it is not that I don’t care, but, it is like (T laughs) it is 
hard to explain. When you explain it sounds like coldness…(interviewer 1).  
 
 In fact, despite the challenges in trying to define what compassion is the trust 
that emerges from the cultivation of an open, non-judging and compassionate attitude 
seems central in the informant’s narratives. 
 
 It is really hard to explain compassion, but it is when I use my heart instead of 
my mind. So I can still see their suffering, if they really need a hug I give them an 
hug, when they go, but I trust that they can manage, fully. So it is quite good also for 
us to work with it. Because you don’t have to bring it [the work] home. I can think 
about a client sometimes but I  know they mange. They are on a journey. Somehow I 
trust that they will get there, where they want go, anytime, in a year or next week 
(interview 1). 
  
 In the fragment presented the informant clearly states how compassion helps 
to equip the therapist with a sense of trust toward her clients and their ability to 
manage their problems. Such a stance implies an understanding of the clients as 
already fully able to account for their life contrary to the main underpinnings of the 
disease model of addiction.  In this sense the therapists seem to embrace a perspective 
that is closer to the choice model of addiction than to the disease model and thus in 
line with a harm-reduction approach to substance treatment (Bayles, 2014). 
  Among the main implications of such a vantage point  is that treatment is not 
considered as compulsory and thus is not implemented in a coercive manner (Bayles, 
2014). This opposes the paternalistic approach to drug treatment that characterizes the 
Swedish context (e.g., Hallam, 2010; Edman & Stenius, 2014; Moore, Fraser, 
Törrönen & Eriksson Tinghög, 2015) and its underling zero tolerance ideology (e.g., 
Edman, 2013; Edman & Stenius, 2014; Ekendhal, 2012). Secondly, in line with the 
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choice model of addiction users are considered active agents able to decide if use or 
not use substances and are the sole responsible for their lives and healing.  
 Furthermore, the compassionate, non-judging and accepting features of 
mindfulness are both central components of mindfulness as systematized in its 
original sources and in its application in the therapeutic encounter. Thus the 
implementation of mindfulness and MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders 
in the Swedish context may offer a substantially different take on substance use and 
substance disorder treatments if compared to treatments as usual and their underlying 
reference to zero tolerance ideology (e.g., Bayles, 2014; Bowen et al., 2009; Marlatt, 
2002).   
 The therapist’s ability to embody and promote acceptance, non-judgment and 
compassion into the therapeutic encounter with the clients could be considered as a 
translation of the Dharma
15
 in the therapeutic context as underlined by some authors 
(Bodhi, 2011; Feldman &  Kuyken, 2011; Kabatt-Zinn, 2011).Thus, inclusion of 
mindfulness and MBI in Western clinical settings, and in particular in the treatment 
of substance use disorders in the Swedish context is substantially in line with the 
philosophical roots of mindfulness, whose overall aim is the reduction of suffering 
(e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2011; Marlatt, 2002; Teasdale & Chaskalson, 2011a; 2011b). 
 As an informant underlines:  
 
 Mindfulness is a lot about being present but also a big portion of it is 
kindness. We don’t talk about it that much, it’s just about moment to moment and 
being present, but kindness is very important, because you can be present without 
kindness of course (interview 1).  
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 The terms signifies in this context the teaching of the Buddha.  
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1.4.  Mindfulness: therapeutic tool or a way of being?  
As we have noticed in Part I and in the previous analysis, mindfulness and MBIs are 
both an effective and an alternative approach to substance use disorders treatment.  
However, considering their roots in Buddhist philosophy, it is important to explore if 
and how mindfulness and MBIs, as employed in the Swedish landscape of substance 
use disorders treatment, are merely another therapeutic tool or maintain the 
foundational features that mindfulness has within its original sources.  
 In the following the analysis and discussion of the informants’ narratives  
attempts to clarify this point. From a careful reading of the empirics gathered, it 
emerges that mindfulness is perceived by the informants as both an effective 
therapeutic tool and as fostering  a substantially different way of being. This way of 
being displays an alternative to the doing mode and its automatisms (Kabat-Zinn, 
1990; Williams et al., 2007). Thus a picture of mindfulness as transcending its role as 
a mere therapeutic tool emerges as a central theme in several narratives. 
 The following extract is a good example of the informants’ take on 
mindfulness, which is considered as both a therapeutic tool and a way of living. 
 
 It gives you a chance to widen it up…But quite a few [clients] come here, and 
if I ask them, what do you want from this group? Well, I want to be sober, I want to 
have a better relation with my wife and so on. Yeah, and then what do you really 
want? What are you really longing for? Then comes like this, well I’m not really, I 
don’t really like the way I am living and there is something missing and I am longing 
for something else…but [mindfulness] it gives you, it’s a double chance that is quite 
extraordinary compared to a lot of other things we can give them (interview 3). 
 
 According to the informant MBIs display as a double chance for the 
participants. On the one hand MBIs are considered as a therapeutic tool, able to help 
the participants to deal with their problematic conditions, and on the other hand they 
offer the chance to further explore on a deeper level the possibility of transformative 
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life’s changes. As the same informant further stresses, even though the focus of 
MBRP is to maintain sobering and prevent relapses the transformative impact of this 
approach, given its roots in mindfulness and its underlying philosophy, are profound 
and pervade every aspect of its practitioners’ life, such as eating, speaking with others 
and be a parent among the rest.  
 
 This is more like, I do this to maintain sober, you don’t want a relapse in your 
all life, but mindfulness is very much how you eat, how you talk with the other person, 
how you handle your children, so I think, the side effects could be very positive and 
profound (interview 3).  
 
 However there are growing concerns, especially from Buddhist scholars 
regarding the plausible inclusion of mindfulness in clinical practice. These concerns 
arise from the fear that mindfulness as conceptualized in its modern application 
struggles to account for the complexities and nuances of its conceptualization in the 
original sources (e.g., Bodhi, 2011; Dreyfus, 2011; Gethin, 2011). There are many 
voices that support the integration of mindfulness in clinical practice, underlying how 
the overall aims of both mindfulness as originally conceptualized and therapeutic 
practices is the reduction of suffering (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2011; Marlatt, 2002; 
Teasdale & Chaskalson, 2011a; 2011b).  
 Is there a conflict between mindfulness as a therapeutic tool on the one hand 
and its being a philosophy of life on the other? The following fragment exemplifies 
the informants take on this issue, emphasizing that the therapists need to be aware of 
the double role of mindfulness, as both a philosophy of life, as conceptualized in the 
Buddhist sources, and as a therapeutic tool. 
  
 I had and I have still some problems because for me of course it’s 
[mindfulness] more religious, and as my client said it’s something  more, what did he 
say? Magical and holy and stuff…So here I have to keep track that I am like, keeping 
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it in the limits, saying we are not doing traditional meditation, saying we are doing 
sitting exercises where we are observing our thoughts or whatever (informant laughs) 
but for me it’s highly spiritual of course. And secret somehow,  and I think the clients 
who dig into it deeply come into contact with this. But I don’t think, I don’t see, I 
mean, it’s not really a conflict. It’s more that I have to be aware of that.  
 
 Thus, the double nature of mindfulness is at times a challenge for the 
therapists, but there does not seem to be a substantial conflict between mindfulness as 
originally conceptualized and its application in the Swedish landscape of substance 
use disorders treatment. Hence the empirics suggest that mindfulness is both a 
therapeutic tool and a way of being for both therapists and clients. In fact, even if 
many of the issues related to the inclusion of mindfulness in clinical practice deserve 
further attention, the previous narratives contribute to delineate how mindfulness as it 
is applied in clinical work transcends this very contextual delimitation, expanding 
into other aspects of the lives of its practitioners, for both therapists and clients. In 
this light it is possible to claim that the Buddhist roots of mindfulness are somehow 
an integral part of mindfulness and MBIs in Western clinical contexts, and that the 
major concern should be directed not on its inclusion per se, but on the scientific 
investigations used in order to validate such an inclusion. However, the fact that 
mindfulness is for the social workers more than a mere therapeutic tool represents a 
challenge for their professional practice since it requires them to carefully balance 
their own take on it and its implementation as a clinical tool. 
 
2. Conclusion 
 What have we learned from this context-sensitive phenomenological analysis 
of social workers experiences of working with mindfulness and MBIs in the field of 
substance use disorders in Sweden? What main implications can we now indentify, 
for both future research and clinical practice? Recalling the main question this thesis 
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attempts to answer, in what way can mindfulness and MBIs influence the therapeutic 
relationship and the treatment of substance use disorders in the Swedish context?  
 This final section is dedicated to answer this question. But before providing 
the conclusions of this work, the aim and overall content of the thesis are briefly re-
proposed in order to facilitate the contextualization of the findings presented. 
 The aim of this work has been to contribute to the current body of work on 
mindfulness in social work, attempting to overcome the mainstream approach to the 
study of mindfulness and its clinical applications. It has employed the experience of 
five Swedish practitioners to understand the influence of mindfulness in the social 
work therapeutic relationship and the advantages and challenges that MBIs offer in 
the treatment of substance use disorders. Thanks to the context-sensitive descriptive 
phenomenological research design implemented, the research has been 
contextualized within the debates on substance use and substance disorders treatment 
in the Swedish context.   
 This work has been built around the recognition, analysis and discussion of 
three great tensions.  
 Regarding the first tension, namely the gap between theory and practice as 
found in the literature, the phenomenological approach employed displays as a 
valuable tool in understanding social workers’ interactions with the clients within the 
framework of MBIs and in further detecting the practical unfolding of mindfulness 
and MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders.  As emerged from the analysis 
and discussion of the empirics, within the framework of the therapeutic employment 
of mindfulness and MBIs, the social workers’ relationship with their clients seems to 
be characterized by trust, recognition and autonomy. Furthermore mindfulness helps 
to foster practitioners’ awareness of their own cognitive and emotional life, 
preventing burn-out, work-related stress and allowing them to establish a solid 
relational ground with the clients.  
 Framing in phenomenological terms what emerged from the analysis and 
discussion of the empirics, mindfulness seems to allow the therapists to fully account 
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for the psychic realm of their clients, thus accessing their lived meanings. Thus the 
therapists move away from the natural attitude, defined as our common lenses 
characterized by judgments, pre-assumptions and based on our rationalists cause-
effect reasoning. As a result the therapists are primarily directed toward the clients’ 
experiences and their underlying motives. It is exactly this shift to the phenomenal 
realm that, as previously underlined, allows the social workers to gain an increased 
awareness of their own cognitive and emotional life. Moreover, the shift to the 
phenomenal realm facilitates an understanding of the practitioners’ empathic 
presence toward their clients and their expressive unity. Finally, the employment of 
mindfulness and MBIs in the treatment of substance use disorders helps to develop 
an observational stance towards one’s experience, thus fostering the substitution of 
reactive tendencies with skillful responses.  
 In these regards, the notion of phenomenological-psychological reduction, 
defined as the process of deliberately bracketing everything else (e.g., one’s own pre-
assumption, judgments and considerations) apart from the clients experience, has 
also proven to be a valuable tool to theorize the practical unfolding of mindfulness in 
clinical work, with particular reference to the relationship between social workers 
and clients.  
 Secondly, regarding the debate between first-person and third-person 
perspective, the centrality of the body in the therapeutic work based on mindfulness 
recalls to our attention both phenomenological inquiries and contemplative practices 
such as Yoga and meditation. This focus on the body is substantially in antithesis 
with treatment as usual such as RP and CBT, where, in line with a rationalist stance 
to knowledge, the cognitive dimension is the focus of the intervention. In fact the 
analysis proposed here suggests that the understanding of one’s situation in the 
context of MBIs is primarily a bodily understanding. Here the client’s perceptual 
engagement with their senses, or in other words their first-person, experience-based 
perspective, helps to break the ruminative cycles. It is important to stress once again 
how the observational stance promoted by the cultivation of one’s awareness fosters 
56 
 
in this context the ability to be present to one’s own experience and to emphasize 
with the experiences of the other. 
 Thirdly, mindfulness and MBIs display as a valuable alternative to both the 
overall Swedish drug policy on an ideological level, and to its mainstream treatment 
methods treatment wise. In fact MBIs are based on a non-judging, accepting, and 
compassionate approach to the clients and their substance use issue. In this context 
relapses represent a normal aspect of the recovery process, and clients are deeply 
trusted and regarded as active agents able to fully navigate in their lives.  
 Within the framework of substance use disorders treatment with mindfulness 
and MBIs all that is required to the clients is the cultivation of an observational 
stance toward their own experiential field, thus learning to recognize their reactive 
and automatic tendencies, such as for instance substance use and abuse. Furthermore, 
this observational stance allows the clients to recognize how they are not their 
problems, thus creating a space of greater acceptance and control in the life of the 
client. 
 Then considering how foundational features of mindfulness such as 
acceptance, non-judgment, compassion, and its observational stance, are effectively 
applied within the Swedish system of substance use disorders treatment, stresses the 
relevance, effectiveness and current inclusion of traditional Buddhist thought within 
the framework of western clinical settings. Thus, the inclusion of mindfulness into 
clinical settings is primarily fostered by the practitioners’ ability to embody the 
teaching of the Buddha. In fact, as it emerges from the last area of analysis, 
mindfulness does not merely display as a clinical intervention but as an overreaching 
life stance able to offer alternative vantage points if compared to our rationalist, third-
person perspective for its practitioners, whether social workers or clients.  
 Yet the inclusion of mindfulness and MBIs in Western clinical settings is not 
problem free although the overall aims of both mindfulness as originally 
conceptualized and as therapeutic practices is the reduction of suffering. The fact that 
for the social workers mindfulness is more than a mere therapeutic tool represents a 
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challenge for their professional practice as it requires them to carefully balance their 
own take on it and its implementation as a clinical tool.  
 However, this thesis suggests that more concern should be directed not on 
mindfulness inclusion in Western settings per se, but on the scientific investigations 
used in order to validate such an inclusion. In fact, as we have previously noticed, the 
mainstream approach to the study of mindfulness and its clinical application is based 
on epistemological and methodological stances that allow only a partial investigation 
of the phenomenon. 
 
2.1. Recommendation for future research 
Concluding, this thesis suggests that phenomenology, and in particular Husserlian 
phenomenology, may be among the most promising approaches in theorizing 
mindfulness, and thus deserves to be accounted for as such in future research. Such a 
task seems particularly relevant considering how phenomenology offers the chance to 
study mindfulness from its own vantage point, from a first-person, experience-based 
perspective, contrary to the mainstream research on mindfulness and its clinical 
applications. Thus the phenomenological approach proposed not only contributes to 
fill the research gap previously underlined but provides an alternative methodology 
for the study of mindfulness in its clinical applications. In particular, exploring the 
notions of empathy and expressive unity in relation to the clinical application of 
mindfulness displays as an interesting task since it may allow us to further ground our 
understanding of mindfulness as it unfolds in therapeutic work and gain further 
insights on one of the foundational features of successful therapeutic work such as 
empathy.  
 Further research may be oriented toward the employment of post-colonial 
lenses, and in particular the concept of hybridity in relation to the study of, and 
attempt to further explore and discuss the processes of inclusion of mindfulness in 
Western clinical settings.  
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 Finally, and of particular relevance in relation to the Swedish context, 
considering how the study on the employment of mindfulness in the treatment of 
substance use disorders is at its very beginning, exploring mindfulness and MBIs as 
plausible alternatives to the current mainstream treatment methods and their 
underling ideology deserves further attention. This line of research could be pursued 
both accounting for phenomenological inquiries as the one here proposed, or 
designing studies aimed at explicitly evaluating and comparing mindfulness and 
MBIs with treatments as usual, such as randomized controlled trials.  
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4. Appendix 1 
 
4.1. List of abbreviations 
 
ACT: act commitment therapy 
CBT: cognitive behavioral therapy  
CT: cognitive therapy 
DBT: Dialectical Behavioral Therapy  
IPA: interpretative phenomenological analysis  
MBIs: mindful-based interventions 
MBCT: Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for depression  
MBRP: Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention  
MBSR: Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction  
RFT: relational frame theory 
RP: relapse prevention 
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
 
 
